In this study, we introduce the opportunity for physicians to sort into capitation or fee-for-service payment. Using a controlled medically framed laboratory experiment with a sequential within-subject design allows isolating sorting from incentive effects. We observe a strong preference for fee-for-service payment, which does not depend on subjects' prior experience with one of the two payment schemes. Further, we identify a significant sorting effect.
may choose between working for a health maintenance organization usually offering CAP payment or a traditional practice with FFS payment. In Germany, physicians can opt between treating privately insured patients being remunerated by FFS and treating statutorily insured ones being remunerated by CAP. Last, but not least, some countries directly offer a menu of contracts and allow physicians to sort into a scheme rather than specifying a single contract. Such menus of contracts are already in place for physicians in provinces across Canada. Here, physicians can choose among traditional FFS payment and an alternative payment mode.
Despite the various channels by which physicians can sort into a payment scheme, the evidence on incentive and sorting effects due to physician payment choice is scarce. To the best of our knowledge, the only empirical evidence stems from the introduction of contract menus in Canada. Although several studies investigate either the incentive effect of a reform from a single contract to a menu of contracts on output (e.g., Dumont, Fortin, Jacquemet, & Shearer, 2008; Fortin, Jacquemet, & Shearer, 2010) or the sorting effect (e.g., Kantarevic & Kralj, 2013; Rudoler et al., 2015) , only Devlin and Sarma (2008) aim at disentangling the incentive effect from the sorting effect. Using the 2004 National Physician cross-sectional survey for family physicians across Canada, they report that a change from a traditional FFS payment to a choice between FFS and alternative payment schemes (i.e., different types of mixed payments and salary) leads to a positive sorting effect and a large negative incentive effect measured by patient visits per week. As treatment decisions observed in the field might be influenced by a variety of factors other than that controlled in these studies, making causal inferences is rather difficult, though. Moreover, in the field, it is not possible to observe how physicians would have treated patients given the alternative payment scheme and, consequently, whether they use the chosen payment scheme to behave in a more profit-or patient-oriented manner.
There are also some non-health-related laboratory experiments investigating sorting effects regarding productivity and efficiency (see, e.g., Bartling, Fehr, Maréchal, & Schunk, 2009; Bejarano, Green, & Rassenti, 2017; Cadsby, Song, & Tapon, 2007; Eriksson & Villeval, 2008; Fehrenbacher & Pedell, 2012; Larkin & Leider, 2012; Macpherson, Prasad, & Salmon, 2014; Teyssier, 2008) .
1 , for instance, introduce a sequential design in which they, first, elicit productivity levels for a real effort task and, then, give participants the choice between a fixed and a variable payment scheme. They find that output is higher with variable payment compared to the fixed payment and that the difference is mainly driven by productivity sorting. However, it is not clear how the results from non-health-related environments translate to the specifics of a physician-patient relationship. In particular, previous studies have shown that medical service provision is not solely profit-oriented but also considers patient benefits (see, e.g., Brosig-Koch et al., 2016; Brosig-Koch et al., 2017; Godager & Wiesen, 2013; Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011) . Furthermore, there might be inherent preferences among physicians for a FFS or CAP payment scheme. In a survey study among Norwegian medical students, Abelsen and Olsen (2015) find that the preference for a payment scheme may be driven by gender differences among others. Moreover, from behavioral economics, we know that humans have a tendency to do something when faced with a problem irrespective of its consequences. This phenomenon is called "action bias" (see, e.g., Patt & Zeckhauser, 2000 , or Bar-Eli, Azar, Ritov, Keidar-Levin, & Schein, 2007 . Thus, physicians might want to choose FFS payment, because they want to provide a considerable number of medical services (just because they feel better when they "do something", not because this makes patients necessarily better off). This study uses the controlled environment of the laboratory to investigate the effects of introducing an option to sort into CAP or FFS payment on provision behavior. Our experimental design allows identifying causal relationships as we can ceteris paribus introduce the option to choose between physician payment schemes. Further, by using a sequential within-subject design and implementing payment schemes and patient characteristics in a way that they are fully symmetric, we are able to test for sorting effects while keeping incentive effects constant. Finally, by applying the strategy method (Selten, 1967) , we are able to observe treatment choices for both, the preferred and the non-preferred payment scheme.
With our experimental design, we particularly aim at answering the following three research questions. First, do subjects prefer a specific type of payment-FFS or CAP-even when monetary incentives do not suggest a difference between the two schemes? In case that subjects' payment choices result from purely monetary concerns, we should observe no specific preference for one of the two schemes (Hypothesis 1a). However, with FFS payment, doing more makes subjects better off with respect to their profits than doing less, whereas it is the other way around with CAP payment. So if subjects' behavior is guided by an "action bias", the share of subjects choosing FFS payment should be higher than 50% (Hypothesis 1b). Second, are there any sorting effects? Again, if subjects only consider their monetary payoffs, there should be no sorting effects (Hypothesis 2a). Alternatively, one might argue that there are specific types of subjects who are less prone to provide medical services as such and, thus, are less likely to prefer FFS payment (e.g., those who are more concerned with patient benefits). Accordingly, there might be sorting effects in a way that those subjects who sort into CAP are more patient-oriented than those who sort into FFS payment (Hypothesis 2b). Third, how does introducing an opportunity to choose between the two payment schemes affect provision behavior and, thus, patient benefits? As we are not aware of any literature that suggests a change of behavior after payment choice, we hypothesize that the opportunity to choose a payment scheme does not affect provision behavior in our symmetric setting (Hypothesis 3).
In line with Hypothesis 1b, our results reveal that a vast majority of subjects prefers FFS over CAP payment despite the fact that, in our design, monetary incentives are fully symmetric. This observation does depend neither on subjects' prior experience with one of the two schemes nor on their medical background. In line with Hypothesis 2b, sorting effects are identified insofar as subjects who deviate more from the patient-optimal quantity before introducing a choice option are more likely to sort into FFS payment when a choice option is provided. In contrast to Hypothesis 3, these subjects are also more likely to reveal even more selfish behavior after their payment choice. Overall, we observe that replacing a predetermined FFS or CAP payment by an opportunity to sort into one of the two schemes can worsen medical treatment. The paper is organized as follows. The experimental design is described in Section 2. In Section 3 we present the results of our data analyses. We conclude in Section 4.
| EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In order to study the effects of introducing an option to sort into a payment scheme, the experiment consists of two parts.
| Part 1: No payment choice
In Part 1, we confront subjects with a predetermined payment scheme, either CAP or FFS payment that represents a situation before the introduction of a payment choice. At this point of time, subjects have no information about the content of Part 2 (but know that there will be a second part). The decision situation employed in Part 1 of the experiment is similar to the basic design in Brosig-Koch et al. (2016 . Each subject i decides in the role of a physician on the quantity of medical services q = {0, 1, …, 10}. The chosen quantity determines the subject's profit π 2 Illnesses and severities imply a certain shape of the patient benefit function (see Figure 1 ): An illness determines the level of (a global) maximum benefit B kl (q * ) with B Al (q * ) = 7, B Bl (q * ) = 10 and B Cl (q * ) = 14, as well as the slope θ kl of the patient benefit with θ Al = θ Bl = |1| and θ Cl = |2|. 3 The severity of an illness determines the patient-optimal quantity q
The complete set of parameter values is included in Appendix S1. The mirror-symmetric design of patient benefits in our population allows to directly compare choices between the payment schemes (which are also mirror-symmetric and which are described below). The monetary equivalent of the patient benefit resulting from a subject's quantity choice is transferred to real patients with eye cataract outside the laboratory (see the description in Section 2.3).
Physician remuneration in CAP is a lump-sum payment per patient of 10, that is, R CAP = 10. In FFS, physicians are paid a fee for each quantity of medical services they provide for a patient, that is, R FFS (q) = 2q. Physician costs also depend on this quantity and are equal to c(q) = 0.1q 2 for both remuneration schemes. 4 Accordingly, physician i ′ s profit per patient is π i (q) = 10 − 0.1q 2 in CAP and π i (q) = 2q − 0.1q 2 in FFS. By choosing a quantity of medical services subjects, hence, face a trade-off between their own profit and patients' benefits. As illustrated in Figure 2 , profit functions are designed in a way that they are fully symmetric. That is, the maximum profit a physician can achieve is the same in both payment schemes, that is, b π
Moreover, marginal changes of profits are identical in CAP and FFS. The only difference between the two schemes is the physician profit maximizing quantity of medical services b q, which is 0 for CAP and 10 for FFS. As patient health benefits are also fully symmetric, we are able to directly compare physician incentives in the two payment conditions.
| Part 2: Payment choice
In Part 2, subjects are given the opportunity to choose one of the two payment schemes FFS or CAP. To ensure comparability of all conditions and parts, we use the same profit functions and the same population of nine patients as in Part 1. Due to our completely symmetric design of incentives, a systematic preference for CAP or FFS cannot result from purely monetary concerns. We are, thus, able to test whether there are other influences that matter for subjects' choice of a payment scheme. As previous experience might be one of those influences, our experimental conditions control for subjects' familiarity with the payment schemes. In conditions FFS-FIRST (CAP-FIRST) subjects are confronted with FFS (CAP) in Part 1. In condition NO-FIRST-STRAT, subjects have no experience with either one of the two schemes (i.e., they did not participate in Part 1; see Table 1 below).
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To obtain behavioral data in both, the preferred and the non-preferred payment scheme, we applied the strategy method (Selten, 1967) in Part 2 of the baseline conditions. Conditions with the strategy method in Part 2 are, henceforth, labeled STRAT. Subjects are informed that, by stating their choice of the payment scheme, the probability of the preferred scheme being payoff-relevant is increased to 2/3. After stating their payment choice, subjects make their treatment decisions for both schemes not knowing which of the two schemes will be selected. The payoff-relevant payment scheme was determined by a lottery not until the end of the experiment. Applying the strategy method does 5 Condition NO-FIRST-STRAT represents a situation in which new physicians have to choose between payment schemes without having gained experience with any one of these schemes. Note that we abstained from implementing a full-order reversal of the two parts that would imply implementing a payment choice in Part 1 and then abandoning this choice in Part 2. Given that, in most countries, a choice option was introduced based on a predetermined payment scheme, a full order reversal does not seem to add practically relevant insights to our results. not only allow for a within-subject comparison of decisions made in the preferred and the non-preferred payment scheme in Part 2, it also enables within-subject comparisons between the two parts as well as respective betweensubject comparisons. As such, our procedure allows disentangling incentive and sorting effects (which is not possible in the field). As applying the strategy method might by itself affect subjects' behavior (see Brosig, Weimann, & Yang, 2003 , or the review provided by Brandts & Charness, 2011), we employ the control conditions FFS-FIRST-REAL and CAP-FIRST-REAL. Here, the chosen payment scheme is realized with certainty, and subjects make their treatment decisions for their chosen scheme, only. Conditions with real payment choice in Part 2 are, henceforth, labeled REAL.
| Experimental procedure
At the beginning of each part, subjects received written instructions for this part. After reading the instructions, subjects were asked to answer some control questions.
6 If all questions were answered correctly, subjects had to choose a quantity of medical treatment for each of the nine patients in Part 1. In Part 2, subjects first had to choose their preferred payment scheme before making their treatment decisions. At the end of the experiment, we elicited basic personal characteristics like gender, field of study, personality traits, and risk preferences in a questionnaire. 7 Then, subjects privately received their payment and were dismissed. To avoid income effects, only one of the nine treatment decisions made in each part was randomly selected to be relevant for the subject's payoff and the patient benefit in that part. In Part 2 of our conditions with the strategy method, we first determined the payoff-relevant payment scheme based on the probabilities that resulted from a subject's payment choice. After that, one of the nine treatment decisions made in this scheme in Part 2 was randomly selected to be relevant for the subject's payoff and the patient benefit in this part. Subjects received information about their payoff and the associated patient benefit for Part 1 and Part 2 not until the end of the experiment. The monetary value of patient benefits for the two randomly chosen treatment decisions, aggregated across all subjects, was transferred to the Christoffel-Blindenmission. To verify this transfer, we applied a procedure similar to Eckel and Grossman (1996) , Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011 ), and Brosig-Koch et al. (2016 . After the experiment, a subject who had been randomly chosen beforehand acted as monitor and verified that a correct transfer order on the aggregated benefit in the respective session was written to the university's financial department. The monitor and experimenter then walked together to the nearest mailbox and deposited the order in a sealed envelope. The monitor was paid an additional Euro 5. Note. The table summarizes the six experimental conditions. The first two words refer to the predetermined payment scheme implemented in Part 1 of the experiment (FFS, CAP, or NOne). The third word refers to the decision elicitation procedure (STRAT or REAL). STRAT = Subjects are informed that, by stating their choice of the payment scheme, the probability of the preferred scheme being payoff-relevant is increased to 2/3. Thus, subjects make their treatment decisions for CAP and FFS not knowing which of the two schemes will be selected. REAL = The chosen payment scheme is realized with certainty, and subjects make their treatment decisions for their chosen scheme, only (CAP or FFS). In FFS-FIRST-STRAT-MED only medical students participated. For each condition, the number of subjects is given in the last column. FFS = fee-for-service; CAP = capitation; NO = none. Table 1 summarizes the conditions employed in our study. The first two words refer to the predetermined payment scheme implemented in Part 1 of the experiment (FFS, CAP, or NOne). The third word refers to the decision elicitation procedure (STRAT or REAL). In all baseline conditions, we employed the strategy method in Part 2 of the experiment to obtain behavioral data in both, the preferred and the non-preferred payment scheme (for a detailed description of this method see Section 2.2). To check whether implementing the strategy method has any influence on behavior, we additionally employed two control conditions FFS-FIRST-REAL and CAP-FIRST-REAL. In these conditions, subjects made their treatment decisions for their chosen scheme only. To check whether observed decisions depend on subjects' medical background, we employed the control condition FFS-FIRST-STRAT-MED in which only medical students participated.
The experiment was conducted at the "Essen Laboratory for Experimental Economics". By using the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (Greiner, 2015) , we recruited 185 participants (101 female and 84 male), which were all students from the University of Duisburg-Essen. The experiment was computerized using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . A session lasted on average about 80 min. All monetary amounts were given in the experimental currency Taler; the exchange rate being 1 Taler = Euro 0.80. 8 The average payoff for subjects was Euro 13.44 with a minimum of Euro 8.20 and a maximum of Euro 16.00. Overall, Euro 2,248 were transferred to the Christoffel-Blindenmission. Due to cataract surgery costs of, on average, Euro 30, 75 real patients could be treated.
| RESULTS
In the following analyses, we first apply nonparametric tests and then employ regression analyses that additionally control for the potential influence of personal characteristics obtained in the ex-post questionnaire. Table 2 provides an overview of descriptive statistics for treatment quality (i.e., the absolute value of the average distance to the patient-optimal medical treatment) in Part 1 and Part 2 as well as for the payment choice.
| Treatment behavior in Part 1
We first focus on treatment behavior in Part 1 in which subjects were confronted with either a CAP or FFS payment scheme. Averaging over all nine patients, optimal patient treatment is achieved by providing a quantity of five medical services. In line with previous experimental evidence (e.g., Brosig-Koch et al., 2016 Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011) , we find significant overprovision with FFS (by, on average, 1.92 medical services; p = .000, two-tailed one-sample Wilcoxon test) 9 and significant underprovision with CAP (by, on average, 1.99 medical services; p = .000)
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, though less than theoretically predicted assuming strict profit maximization.
11 Also medical students (FFS-FIRST-STRAT-MED)
deviate from patient-optimal treatment, although significantly less than students from other fields of study (on average, they overprovide 1.27 services, p = .038).
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To compare the effects of CAP and FFS payment, we define treatment quality based on the absolute value of the average deviation of the chosen quantity of medical treatment from the patient optimal quantity. According to this definition, both underprovision and overprovision have a positive sign, and a smaller absolute value implies a higher quality (see Table 2 for an overview of treatment quality for each experimental condition). Comparing treatment quality 8 To keep incentives comparable between treatments, this exchange rate was also used in condition NO-FIRST-STRAT in which the experiment lasted for about 60 min, and only one part was paid out. To adjust average payoffs to the time spent in the lab, we additionally paid a participation fee of Euro 3 in this condition. The resulting payoff including the show-up fee ranged from Euro 7.10 to Euro 11.00. 9 Here, we refer to data pooled over FFS-FIRST-STRAT (2.19 medical services) and FFS-FIRST-REAL (1.64 medical services). In these conditions, subjects are confronted with identical instructions in Part 1 and are randomly recruited from the same subject pool. Accordingly, the difference between these conditions regarding treatment behavior in Part 1 is not significant (p = .293, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test). 10 Here we refer to data pooled over CAP-FIRST-STRAT (2.04) and CAP-FIRST-REAL (1.95). Also between these conditions, we do not observe significant differences regarding treatment behavior in Part 1 (p = .738, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test).
11 Similar to Brosig-Koch et al. (2016 we find that underprovision in CAP and overprovision in FFS varies across patient characteristics. The severity of illness significantly affects treatment behavior in both, CAP and FFS (p < .000, two-tailed Wilcoxon test). In CAP, medical treatment of illness C significantly differs from that of illnesses A and B (p < .021), whereas there is no significant difference regarding medical treatment of illnesses A and B (p = .559, two-tailed Wilcoxon tests). In FFS, illnesses do not significantly affect medical treatment (p ≥ .257). As our focus is on sorting effects given a heterogeneous patient population, in the following, we report results based on data pooled over the nine patient types. 12 If not indicated otherwise, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test are applied for between-subject comparisons, and two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test are applied for within-subject comparisons.
between FFS and CAP, we find no significant difference (p = .874).
13 Consequently, in subsequent analyses, we pool our data over the two payment schemes when referring to treatment quality in Part 1.
| Payment choice and sorting effects
In Part 2, we observe that, despite equal profit and patient outcome opportunities, in each condition a significant majority of subjects chooses FFS instead of CAP (p ≤ .087, two-tailed binomial tests). There are no significant differences regarding this share between the conditions (79% in CAP-FIRST-STRAT, 74% in FFS-FIRST-STRAT, 76% in NO-FIRST-STRAT, 67% in FFS-FIRST-REAL, 75% in CAP-FIRST-REAL, and 68% in FFS-FIRST-STRAT-MED; p ≥ .305). Apparently, subjects' choice of a payment scheme is not significantly affected by their previous experience with payment schemes, their medical background, or the decision method, that is, whether the preferred scheme is realized with probability 2/3 or 1. 14 Our results on subjects' payment choice are not in line with Hypothesis 1a but support Hypothesis 1b. Using logistic regression models allows to further explain individual payment choice (in these models, 0 stands for a choice of CAP and 1 for a choice of FFS). Given our within-subject design, we are able to relate subjects' behavior revealed in Part 1 to their payment choice made in Part 2 and, thus, to test Hypotheses 2, which refers to potential sorting effects. Accordingly, the regressions include DISTANCE TO PATIENT-OPTIMAL TREATMENT PART 1 as main explanatory variable. Our control variables comprise gender (female), personality traits (extraversion: BFI_E, agreeableness: BFI_A, conscientiousness: BFI_C, neuroticism: BFI_N, and openness: BFI_O), and risk preference (risk).
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Controlling for the impact of the experimental condition in a first step (see Table 3 ) confirms that the choice of the payment scheme does not depend on the predetermined payment scheme (Model 1 with pooled CAP-FIRST-STRAT 13 Here, we compare all CAP-FIRST and FFS-FIRST conditions except FFS-FIRST-STRAT-MED, that is, on average 1.99 versus 1.92 medical services.
There is also no significant difference between CAP and FFS when comparing decisions for each of the nine patients separately (p ≥ .210, Mann-Whitney U tests), except from Patient 2 (p = .044). Note that the comparison of CAP and FFS requires an inverse change of severities of illnesses. Moreover, there is no difference between CAP and FFS when comparing decisions separately for subjects who subsequently choose FFS and for subjects who subsequently choose CAP (FFS-preferring subjects: p > .191, except Patient 2 (p = .014); CAP-preferring subjects: p > .302). Table S3 .1 in Appendix S3 includes regression analyses on treatment quality provided in Part 1, which includes additional controls and confirms our previous results.
14 Note that designing concave benefit functions such that providing less treatment always leads to a lower benefit than providing more treatment could also lead to a preference for FFS payment-as least as long we assume that subjects are patient-oriented (but are not fully altruistic). Our results reveal that such a preference can be observed even in case that benefit functions are fully symmetric. 15 Risk is the self-assessed measure on an 11-item scale. A higher value of risk refers to a lower degree of risk aversion. Note. Number of subjects who choose CAP (# choice CAP) and FFS (# choice FFS) in each condition in Columns 1 and 2. Share of FFS-preferring subjects in Column 3. Descriptive statistics for Part 1 are given in Columns 4-6. Column 4 displays the absolute value of the average distance to patient-optimal medical treatment in Part 1 for all subjects. Columns 5 and 6 are separated by payment choice. For Part 2, Columns 7 and 8 display the average distance to patient-optimal treatment in the preferred payment scheme. FFS = fee-for-service; CAP = capitation.
and CAP-FIRST-REAL as baseline), on applying the strategy method (Model 2 with pooled CAP-FIRST-REAL and FFS-FIRST-REAL as baseline), and on subjects' medical background (Model 3 with FFS-FIRST-STRAT as baseline).
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When adding our main explanatory variable and further controls (see Models 4-6 in Table 4 ), we find that in all three models a higher individual deviation from patient-optimal treatment (i.e., a lower quality) is significantly positively related to the probability to choose FFS. 17 So we have to reject Hypothesis 2a in favor of Hypothesis 2b. Moreover, we observe that the choice of payment scheme does not depend on gender, on personality traits, or on the individual risk attitude with one exception. Subjects who are more agreeable (i.e., appear to be more cooperative, considerate, and trusting) tend to be more likely to prefer a CAP payment (see Model 4). The advantage of applying the strategy method in Part 2 is that it allows for a within-subject comparison of decisions made in the preferred and the non-preferred payment scheme. Because the payment scheme implemented in Part 1 does not significantly affect treatment quality revealed in the preferred schemes and in the non-preferred schemes, respectively, in Part 2 (p ≥ .603), the following analyses are based on data pooled over conditions CAP-FIRST-STRAT and FFS-FIRST-STRAT. The results are illustrated in Figure 3 . Subjects who sort into FFS seem to discriminate between the two schemes in Part 2, that is, they subsequently provide a significantly lower treatment quality in their preferred scheme FFS than in their non-preferred scheme CAP (2.40 versus 2.66 medical services, p = .005). For subjects who sort into CAP, we do not find a significant difference (1.55 versus 1.76 medical services, p = .277).
18 Moreover, subjects who sort into FFS are, on average, (weakly) significantly less patient-oriented than the CAP-preferring subjects in both, their preferred payment scheme FFS and their non-preferred scheme CAP in Part 2 (2.66 vs. 1.76 medical services and 2.40 vs. 1.55 medical services, p = .070 and p = .027). Our results on behavior in Part 2 are robust to subjects' medical background. 18 Note that the number of observations for CAP-preferring subjects is relatively low (i.e., 16 out of the 69 observations for the STRAT conditions).
19 Also medical students discriminate their treatment decisions between their preferred and their non-preferred scheme (p = .001 for FFS-preferring medical students and p = .078 for CAP-preferring medical students). Moreover, FFS-preferring medical students are, on average, weakly significantly less patient-oriented than the CAP-preferring medical students in both, their preferred payment scheme FFS and their non-preferred scheme CAP in Part 2 (p = .058 and p = .057). *, **, and ***significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively; standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual level.
Due to the previously described behavioral patterns, subjects who sort into CAP provide, on average, a higher treatment quality in their preferred scheme CAP in Part 2 than those who sort into FFS do in their preferred scheme FFS in Part 2 (2.66 vs. 1.55 medical services; p = .011). As we do not observe significant differences regarding treatment quality in the preferred schemes in Part 2 between CAP-FIRST-STRAT and CAP-FIRST-REAL (p = .572) as well as between FFS-FIRST-STRAT and FFS-FIRST-REAL (p = .580), we also run this comparison for the larger sample pooled over STRAT and REAL conditions and observe a similar behavioral pattern (p = .009). 20 The observed difference is also robust to subjects' medical background (p = .041). 21 To analyze the determinants of individual treatment quality in Part 2,
we run regression models on the average deviation from patient-optimal treatment per subject revealed in the preferred scheme, whereas a negative sign of the coefficient stands for an increased treatment quality (Table 5 ). The independent variables are in all regressions the same as in the previous regressions (see Table 4 ). We additionally add a dummy variable for payment choice, which is 1 if the preferred scheme is FFS. For all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the subject level. We use a simple ordinary least squares regression.
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Again, we find no significant differences between STRAT and REAL in Part 2 (Model 1), and also none between CAP and FFS (Model 2). Adding all covariates does not change the results (Model 3). For students with medical background, we find a significantly higher treatment quality than for students of other fields (Model 4). Adding all covariates (Model 5), the difference between medical students and students of other fields disappears. Considering payment choice reveals that FFS-preferring subjects exhibit a significantly lower treatment quality (Models 3 and 5). In contrast to the previous regression results on payment choice, we now find a significant relation between treatment quality and gender: Females deviate less from patient optimum in their preferred scheme than males. Also the personality trait agreeableness significantly matters for the treatment quality: Subjects who appear to be more cooperative, considerate, and trusting provide a higher quality. Including an interaction term for students with medical background and BFI_A reveals that this 20 In the pooled sample, CAP-preferring subjects deviate by an average of 1.64 medical services from the patient-optimal medical treatment in their preferred scheme, whereas FFS-preferring subjects deviate by about 2.48 medical services. 21 Averages can be directly obtained from Table 2 (row FFS-FIRST-STRAT-MED). 22 We also applied an ordered probit model to our data (equivalent to Models 3 and 5 in Table 5 ) in which the deviation from patient-optimal treatment (i.e., treatment quality) is measured as an ordered outcome (see Table S4 .2 in Appendix S4). The results are similar to ordinary least squares. Moreover, applying a hurdle model equivalent to Models 3 and 5 in Table 5 reveals similar results (see Table S4 .1 and Figure S4 .1 in Appendix S4). *, **, and ***significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively; standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual level.
effect does not hold for medical students (Model 6). All other variables-age and risk preferences-are not significantly related to treatment quality provided in the preferred scheme in Part 2.
| Overall effect of payment choice
Comparing subjects' treatment quality between the two parts, we find that subjects sorting into FFS are even less patient-oriented in their preferred scheme FFS in Part 2 than in the predetermined scheme in Part 1 (p = .011). This finding is in contrast to Hypothesis 3. However, subjects sorting into CAP do not significantly change their treatment quality from the predetermined scheme in Part 1 to their preferred scheme in Part 2 (p = .895). 23 Apparently, subjects who sort into CAP (and who are, in general, more patient-oriented) reveal a more stable behavior. Similar results apply if we run this analysis with the larger sample pooled over STRAT and REAL conditions. Although, here, subjects sorting into CAP in Part 2 also tend to be less patient-oriented in their preferred scheme in Part 2 than in the predetermined scheme in Part 1 (p = .0001 for FFS-preferring subjects and p = .086 for CAP-preferring subjects). The results tend to be robust to subjects' medical background (p = .091 for FFS-preferring subjects and p = .953 for CAP-preferring subjects).
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To test the aggregate effects of introducing the opportunity to choose a payment scheme, we compare average treatment quality chosen given either the predetermined FFS or CAP payment in Part 1 with average treatment quality that result from decisions made in the chosen payment schemes in Part 2. Given FFS payment, introducing a choice option does not significantly affect treatment quality (p = .570), although given CAP payment, providing an opportunity to sort into the payment scheme significantly reduces treatment quality (p = .017). The result becomes more pronounced when pooling decisions over STRAT and REAL conditions. With the larger sample, we find that providing an opportunity to sort into the payment scheme significantly reduces treatment quality for both CAP and FFS (p ≤ .005). Apparently, providing an opportunity to sort into a payment scheme can worsen treatment quality. 23 Here, we compare within-subject Parts 1 and 2 for pooled CAP-FIRST-STRAT (16 obs.) and FFS-FIRST-STRAT (53 obs.). The underlying means can be obtained by averaging Rows 1 and 2 in Table 2 , that is, CAP-preferring subjects provide on average 1.58 and 1.54 medical services in Part 1 and Part 2. FFS-preferring subjects provide on average 2.28 and 2.66 medical services. 24 Note that the observed decrease of treatment quality from Part 1 to Part 2 does not seem to be driven by participating in a second part of the experiment as we do not observe a significant difference regarding treatment qualities chosen in the preferred schemes between FIRST-STRAT (Part 2) and NO-FIRST-STRAT conditions, (p = .796) as well as between pooled FIRST (Part 2) and NO-FIRST-STRAT conditions (p = .973). 
| CONCLUSION
In this study, we use a controlled laboratory experiment with medical framing to test the effects associated with the opportunity to sort into physician payment schemes. Our focus is on CAP and FFS payment as these schemes-in a pure form or as a basic component-are frequently implemented in health care. Running a controlled laboratory experiment on the effects of payment choice has the advantage that it allows isolating sorting effects from incentive effects. First, by designing payment schemes with symmetric profit opportunities, incentive effects are held constant in our study. Second, by employing a within-subject design, we are able to observe treatment decisions before and after payment choice that allows isolating sorting effects based on ex ante behavioral pattern. Third, by using the strategy method for treatment decisions made after payment choice, we are able to observe treatment decisions with both, the preferred and non-preferred payment scheme.
Our results reveal that the vast majority of subjects prefer FFS payment. This observation supports our Hypothesis 1b suggesting that there is an inclination to provide medical services as such just because subjects feel better when they "do something", not necessarily because this makes patients better off. The result does depend neither on subjects' prior experience with a payment scheme nor on the decision method (i.e., whether the strategy method is implemented or not), nor on the medical background of subjects. Also other personal characteristics such as gender, risk preferences, or the individual personality traits measured by the Big Five Inventory (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003) do not matter for subjects' choice of a payment scheme. Our data further reveal significant sorting effects. Subjects who choose FFS payment are ex ante (and ex post) less patient-oriented than those who sort into CAP. In line with Hypothesis 2b, it appears that subjects who are more concerned with patient benefits are less inclined to provide medical services as such. Possibly, because they are more focused on providing a certain number of medical services for the patient. Although we did not expect a difference in Hypothesis 3, we find that particularly subjects who sort into FFS are less patient-oriented *, **, and ***significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively; standard errors in parentheses are clustered at subject level.
after their payment choice than before. As a result, providing an opportunity to choose between FFS and CAP payment can worsen medical treatment of patients. We particularly observe that average treatment quality resulting from decisions made in the chosen payment schemes in Part 2 is significantly lower than that observed in the predetermined CAP scheme in Part 1. Our results hold for medical and nonmedical students. Our findings suggest that it is important to consider the influence of potential competing incentives when evaluating the effectiveness of physician payment schemes in health care. For example, policy makers should be aware of potential sorting effects that are associated with making physicians' payment contingent on the organization they choose to work for (e.g., in the U.S. physicians who work for an health maintenance organization receive CAP payment whereas those who work for a traditional practice receive FFS payment). Similar is true when physicians' payment depends on the insurance type of patients (e.g., in Germany treating patients with private insurance results in FFS payment whereas treating patients with statutory insurance results in CAP payment). However, further laboratory and field research is needed to test the specific implications of these policy measures. Moreover, although this study focuses on the choice between FFS and CAP payment, it is an open question whether our results apply also to the choice between other forms of physician incentives.
We designed our laboratory experiment to study payment choice and sorting effects with symmetric profit (benefit) opportunities. By ensuring a high internal validity of our study that allows to isolate causal relationships, we gave up some of the external validity of our results. In particular, there can be additional influences on payment choice in real life from which we abstracted away in our design. For example, we did not employ tax payers or an insurance in our setting (for a first laboratory experiment that involves a third-party payer in a physician-patient relationship see Kesternich, Schumacher, & Winter, 2015) . We also did not include the possibility that, under CAP, some of the risk of patients needing expensive treatment is shifted to the physician. Studying the impact of these potentially influencing factors under controlled laboratory conditions is left for future research.
